

THE COLD WAR, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

Appendix: Alternative Security Policies  
in the Pacific Theater

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In the book There Are Alternatives!<sup>1</sup> a general theory is presented with quite concrete policy suggestions in the field of alternative security policies. The basic idea is to conceive of the security of a country in terms of a combination of high capacity for defensive defense (as opposed to offensive defense<sup>2</sup> or no defense at all), and a high level of invulnerability. Then, defensive defense is seen in terms of two dimensions: the autonomous, nationally based capability of defending the national territory on the soil of that territory (and in territorial waters and territorial air space) with any combination of conventional military defense, para-military defense and nonmilitary defense and, on the other hand, the level of decoupling from military alliances with countries that base their defense on highly offensive doctrines-- , in particular super-powers. In practice the latter means leaning towards, or achieving, non-alignment, but certainly not neutralism in any ideological sense.

Correspondingly, invulnerability also divides into two dimensions: the inner strength of the country in terms of economic self-reliance (meaning capacity for self-sufficiency in basics even in times of war, and trade on an equitable basis beyond that), balance in the country as an eco-system, social cohesion and political autonomy. And, on top of that: the type of invulnerability that does not derive from the inner strength just described but from the outer usefulness to both or all sides in conflicts by having reasonable relations with everybody.

In Table 1 the reader will find an effort to assess the situation of the Pacific Theater, from the point of view of twelve actors or groups of actors located on the littoral or in the Pacific itself. The numbers given, 0, 1 and 2, are "grades": 0 being the lowest meaning no useful development along this dimension, 2 meaning "very satisfactory" and 1 being in-between. Needless to say, these judgments are very subjective and should not be taken too seriously: they serve as a background for highlighting some issues in the Pacific Theater. (See Table 1 on next page.)

The situation is very bleak, particularly as compared with the situation in the Atlantic Theater where in Europe there are a number of countries that score high in this type of exercise. Thus, Switzerland gets a full-house, 8, then follow Yugoslavia and Albania with 6 each, and then Finland and Austria both with 5 and Sweden and Malta with 4. That gives a total of 7 countries, out of which 3 countries can serve as real models--conservative Switzerland, radical Albania and in-between Yugoslavia, indicating by this political characterization that the alternative security option is open for countries of all colors.

An outstanding characteristic of the Pacific Theater is precisely this: there is no model country. The highest score in this presentation is given to Oceania where whatever defense there is cannot possibly be seen as offensive or provocative, but perhaps by default rather than by design. There is also some

TABLE 1. Alternative Security Policies in the Pacific Theater

	<u>Defensive Defense</u>	<u>Decoupling from Super-powers</u>	<u>Inner Strength</u>	<u>Outer Usefulness</u>	SUM
USA	0	0	1	0( $\frac{1}{2}$ )	1( $\frac{1}{2}$ )
Canada	1	0	1	0	2
South America	2	0	0	0	2
Australia	1	0	0	0	1
New Zealand	2	1	0	0	3
Oceania	2	1	1	1	5
ASEAN	2	0	0	0	2
Mini <span style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; margin-left: 5px;"> <span style="font-size: 1em;">/</span> Japans  <span style="font-size: 1em;">\</span> Chinas </span>	1	0	0	0	1
Japan	2	0	0	0	2
Mongolia, Vietnam+ North Korea	1	0	1	0	2
Soviet Union	0	0	1	0( $\frac{1}{2}$ )	1( $\frac{1}{2}$ )
China	1	1	1	1	4
SUM	15	3	6	2(2)	26(27)

vague alignment, but by implication some weak non-alignment. There is some inner strength, there is--particularly recently in connection with the fisheries--some symmetry in outer usefulness.<sup>3</sup>

But Oceania consists of many very small islands, among them some very small countries.<sup>4</sup> They are exposed to tremendous pressure from the dominant country in the region: the United States, of course. Then, one outside power, France, shows its contempt for small country indigenous population by continued atomic testing in the area as well as denial of independence to one of the bigger islands. And then, on top of this also the Soviet Union, although so far in a modest role. In short, whatever peace policy they might engage in these countries are highly vulnerable--the "5" might so easily change downwards to considerably lower grades.

Next in line is China. Certainly not entirely defensive given its nuclear arms, but on the other hand those weapons seem to be deployed inside a doctrine that is more defensive. China is certainly not entirely decoupled today, leaning more to the United States; no longer with the same inner strength as before as China is becoming increasingly trade-dependent; and China still has a good distance to go in order to make the economic relations and other relations more symmetric (but that may change quickly).<sup>5</sup> However, there is something peculiar about China: the largest country population-wise in the world, and yet sometimes as if the country were not in this world at all--in a sense not strange gi-

ven its self-perception as the country located between heaven and earth, traditionally.<sup>6</sup>

Third in line is New Zealand under the present stewardship of Prime Minister David Lange, who seems to operate within a military doctrine of defensive defense, and to a large extent, through nuclear non-alignment, decoupled from the super-powers (how much still remains to be seen)<sup>7</sup>. But the country is heavily trade dependent and far from symmetric in its relations. Also, some of the comments that apply to Oceania would also apply here: the posture is vulnerable, subject to change.

Thus, the total situation, as mentioned, is rather bleak. Perhaps we see it particularly clearly by looking at the bottom line of the table. The total sum is only 26, ideally it should have been 96; a "peace fulfillment" according to this index of only 27%. There is some inclination towards defensive defense. But given the low level of decoupling and the low level of inner strength and outer usefulness the comment above applies: by default, rather than by design. Weak actors, all of them—with the exception Mongolia/North Korea/Vietnam + and the Soviet Union of course one way or the other under the dominion of the United States. Except—China?

So, let us speculate a little about a more desirable situation. Let us assume that the two super-powers will not change for the foreseeable future although they may develop more symmetric

trade relations (as indicated with the hopeful "½" in the table). But let us imagine that China came out in the open, as the biggest actor population-wise in the theater with a completely defensive military doctrine, a strong policy of non-alignment in theory as well as in practice, and friendly relations with both super-powers at the same time, not some type of balance over time, being friendly to only one of them or none of them at the same time. Let us further imagine that the "trade friction" between Japan and the United States leads Japan in the direction of decoupling from the United States, more self-sufficiency and more ability to trade with both sides in the Cold War. And let us then imagine, on top of all this, that a course of action of that type is followed by the mini-Japanas/Chinas and the mini-Soviet Unions of Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam +. Moreover, that Oceania and New Zealand manage to keep the position they have achieved, and also to get Australia with them, up from "1" to at least "3" or "4". In that case the whole picture would certainly look different. Between the two super-powers there would be a vast cushion of countries with an array of different policies, able to absorb in a creative manner a number of different conflicts without getting closer to a war-like situation. More "messy" for fighting a war, considerably better for building a peace precisely because it is messy.<sup>8</sup>

In saying this nothing particular is expected from South America: these regimes are deeply engulfed in their own domestic problems, seeing international relations almost uniquely in terms of relation to the United States, not yet having discovered in any

significant sense the rest of the Pacific Theater. And Canada is a minor actor in this connection, participating in military exercises but not projecting any independent thinking or initiative.

In short, the hope would come from the western, Asian, side of the Pacific or from the Pacific countries themselves, including New Zealand and Australia. And at this point a major difficulty immediately becomes apparent: the countries are so disparate, so far away from each other physically, culturally, socially, economically, politically. If I should make a highly personal conjecture I would not expect too much from Australia or New Zealand beyond what the latter has already done, nor from Oceania because of its vulnerability. This means that I would pin my hopes on the lower half of the table rather than the upper half. ASEAN is today a very important community of nations, 270 million strong, and might one day discover the advantage of also having the Second World as a trade partner, particularly when the United States becomes less able to absorb goods produced elsewhere. The same would apply to the mini-Japans and, as mentioned already, to Japan and China.

In other words, the key to the relationship lies in East Asia, not in the Pacific Theater as such. An East Asia less mesmerized by the United States with a less paranoid and less domineering Soviet Union to the north might develop new relationships that would provide the whole Pacific Theater with a new, more interesting configuration.<sup>9</sup> And above all a configuration with a much higher peace potential than the dangers we are confronting at the present with submarines from both sides increasingly getting entangled with each other.

## N O T E S

[1] Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984; Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1984; Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1984; de Horstink, Amersfoort, 1984; Gidlunds, Stockholm, 1985; FMK-PAX, Oslo, 1985; Abele, Torino, 1986 and Keiso Shobo, Tokyo, 1987.

[2] Ibid., ch. 5.2 for a discussion of the distinction between defensive and offensive weapons systems, based on the range of delivery and the area of destruction. The distinction is certainly not sharp, but sharper than the distinction between offensive weapons systems for first or second strike.

[3] Particularly significant in this connection has been the fisheries' agreement between Fiji and the Soviet Union.

[4] Territorially small in terms of size, demographically small in terms of population, politically small in terms of autonomy - often all three combined. An example is Palau/Belau - see From Trusteeship to - ? Micronesia and Its Future, Pacific Concerns Resource Center, July 1982.

[5] I am thinking of what may happen in the wake of the reorientation of Soviet policy in the "Far East" after Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July 1986.

[6] For a country with a self-image of that kind to insert itself in the world of bilateral and multilateral interaction must be quite problematic.

[7] US pressure seems so far (1986) to have been more rhetorical than real - except for the tension in ANZUS, of course. As late as December 1986 (the ban of US nuclear-capable ships from New Zealand's ports dates from February 1985) US Navy Secretary John Lehman called for US economic sanctions against New Zealand (Japan Times, 17 December 1986). "New Zealand will remain in the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) involving Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore." (Japan Times, 24 December 1986).

[8] See my "Peace Theory: An Introduction," World Encyclopedia of Peace, Pergamon, Oxford, 1987.

[9] For a good example of sober analysis of the Soviet Union, see Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, The Russian Threat: Between Alarm and Complacency, ISIS, Malaysia, 1985. The opening words are:

"We used to be told by many Americans that China was a grave threat. Now we are being told by as many Americans that the Soviet Union is a grave threat and that China is no threat at all."

Also see his "Approaches to peace and economic co-operation in Southeast Asia," in Matsumoto, H. and Sopiee, N. eds., Into the Pacific Era, Southeast Asia and Its Place in the Pacific, ISIS, Malaysia, 1986, pp. 15/24.